Abstract

In late 1964, Lyndon Johnson and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy convened an ad hoc group of distinguished citizens to consider the problem of nuclear proliferation. The creation of this group, known as the Gilpatric Committee, signaled Johnson's fear that a number of foreign policy issues related to proliferation had reached a crisis point in 1964. It also signaled his dissatisfaction with existing bureaucratic arrangements to resolve these problems. After several weeks of deliberation, the committee gave Johnson a report that advocated a sharp intensification of U.S. nonproliferation policy. The committee challenged key aspects of the administration's foreign policy and urged the president to rethink the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Although Johnson shied away from implementing some of the committee's more controversial proposals, the administration eventually embraced the basic philosophy of the report. The Gilpatric Report provided a conceptual foundation for important departures in U.S. foreign relations and national security policy from 1965 until the end of Johnson's presidency.