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Journal of Cold War Studies

Quarterly
(Winter, Spring, Summer, Fall)
192 pp. per issue, 6 x 9
Founded: 1999
ISSN 1520-3972
E-ISSN 1531-3298

Journal of Cold War Studies

Spring 2006, Vol. 8, No. 2, Pages 52-82
Posted Online May 24, 2006.
(doi:10.1162/jcws.2006.8.2.52)
© 2006 Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The Cold War Origins of the U.S. Central Command

William E. Odom

Willian E. Odom, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant-general who has served in many high-level posts in the U.S. government and has also been an adjunct professor of political science at Yale and Georgetown Universities, is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.



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Abstract

During the Carter administration the Middle East and Southwest Asia became a third major theater in the Cold War struggle along with Europe and the Far East. Initially, President Jimmy Carter tried to remove this region from the Cold War competition, but the collapse of the shah's regime in Iran prompted Carter to reverse course and to build a “Persian Gulf security framework” that later allowed the United States to deal with three wars and many smaller clashes. The interagency process implementing this dramatic change was rent with clashes of departmental interests. The State Department and the military services resisted the structural changes they would later need to confront not only the Soviet threat but also intraregional conflicts. Moreover, the Reagan administration, after forcing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make the Central Command formal, actually slowed the process of its growth, leaving it far from ready to embark on the Gulf War in 1990–1991.

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