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Journal of Cold War Studies

Winter 2000, Vol. 2, No. 1, Pages 3-34
Posted Online March 13, 2006.
(doi:10.1162/15203970051032363)
© 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Eisenhower and the Berlin Problem, 1953–1954

David G. Coleman

A research fellow with the Presidential Recordings Project at the University of Virginia's Miller Center of Public Affairs



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Soon after taking office, the Eisenhower administration adopted two key decisions on Berlin and the German question that were to have far-reaching consequences in the 1950s and 1960s. First, Eisenhower reaffirmed the U.S. security commitment to West Berlin, a commitment that entailed at least some risk of general war. Second, the administration prepared to use West Berlin in a broader political strategy aimed at weakening and eventually undermining Soviet power in Eastern Europe. The implications of these early decisions did not become fully evident until 1958, when the administration was confronted by a Soviet ultimatum on Berlin.

Cited by

Evanthis Hatzivassiliou. (2009) Images of the Adversary: NATO Assessments of the Soviet Union, 1953–1964. Journal of Cold War Studies 11:2, 89-116
Online publication date: 1-Apr-2009.
Abstract | PDF (143 KB) | PDF Plus (144 KB) 
Chris Tudda. (2005) “Reenacting the Story of Tantalus”: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Failed Rhetoric of Liberation. Journal of Cold War Studies 7:4, 3-35
Online publication date: 1-Oct-2005.
Abstract | PDF (192 KB) | PDF Plus (201 KB) 
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