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Journal of Cold War Studies

Quarterly
(Winter, Spring, Summer, Fall)
192 pp. per issue, 6 x 9
Founded: 1999
ISSN 1520-3972
E-ISSN 1531-3298

Journal of Cold War Studies

Spring 2000, Vol. 2, No. 2, Pages 69-96
Posted Online March 13, 2006.
(doi:10.1162/15203970051032318)
© 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Anglo-American Nuclear Weapons Cooperation After the Nassau Conference: The British Policy of Interdependence

Michael Middeke

Received his Ph.D. in International History from the London School of Economics and Political Science and is now working in the private sector



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The Anglo-American summit at Nassau in December 1962 did not strictly separate Britain 's deterrent from the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF). As a result, Conservative governments in the 1960s tried to safeguard maximum British independence in nuclear relations with the United States. The British tried to thwart American initiatives on the mixed-manned MLF; some British officials even hoped to preserve an “independent British deterrent” through nuclear cooperation with France. For the United States, the British deterrent had political value in an intra-alliance or East-West context, but no military or political significance in itself. The MLF idea of bilateral nuclear cooperation with Britain and France was a means to contain French and German nuclear ambitions and to settle Cold War disputes with the Soviet Union. In London, however, leading officials believed that Britain's future as a great power was inextricably linked to the possession of an independent nuclear deterrent. When nuclear independence was lost, the appearance of independence became more important.

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